What is the deal with détente?

I've seen a lot of slamming of détente going on in the reflections on the Reagan presidency. Most of these commit the error of lumping Nixonian and Carterian détente together. For Nixon, détente was a strategy to ease tensions, to send both boxers back to their corners for a drink of water and removal of blood about the face. In the declining days of Vietnam, America needed a return to the corner in order to come back out into the ring refreshed.

For Carter, détente was an abidcation of the ring, an attempt to abandon the match, hopefull that a draw could be arranged.

But imagine, if you will, along with me. We know that Ford was staging a strong comeback at the end of the 1976 election, and some speculate that if the campaign lasted another two weeks he could have won. So let's suppose that he did. Let's look at his foriegn policy cabinet for his first full term. Let's assume that At some point, Kissenger is replaced by Haig in the new administration. Its unlikely that the old hand of Kissenger would be disirable in a Ford administration elected in its own right. Haig had been made NATO Commander by Ford, so appointment to State is reasonable. This allows us to draw on Haig's subsequent tenure from 1980-82 as a guide to his action. Donald Rumsfeld was made Secretary of Defence in 1975. Let's keep him on. Now the question is, would a Ford, Haig, Rumsfeld team have given away the arms control store, responded to by Afghanistan by quitting the Olympics, and failed to back the modernist Shah against the Islamic fundamentalists?

A Ford, Haig, Rumsfeld team would certainly have made mistakes (being falible humans) but its hard to imagine that one of two outcomes would have been achived. 1) The Soviets would have been contained by the certainty that the Americans would respond forcefully or 2) the more probable case, the Americans would have argued that the Soviets cast aside détente and would not have been constrained by it in their reactions to Soviet support for terrorism, its arms control violations, and the invasion of Afghanistan.

The purpose of this little experiment is to suggest that détente didn't have to mean a Carter foriegn policy. While its certainly true that once we assume a Carter foriegn polciy, Reagan is the solution, that is not the same thing as a blanket condemnation of détente. Indeed in many regards, Reagan's actions were based on restoring the earlier détente, as reflected in his arms control agreements and many meetings with Gorbachov.